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Abstract
This note shows that in an incomplete information situation the closure condition will be
satisfied by all social choice sets if and only if the set of states of the society which all agents
believeoccur with positive probability satisfies the `connection' condition.It then follows
from Jackson's [1] fundamental theorems that whenever `connection' is satisfied and there are
at least three agents in the society, for the implementability of social choice sets in Bayesian
equilibrium the incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity conditions are both
necessary and sufficient in economic environments. It also follows that the incentive
compatibility and monotonicity-no-veto conditions are sufficient in noneconomic
environments.
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In his seminal paper, Jackson [1] examined the problem of implementing collections
of social choice functions in situations where agents have incomplete information about
the state of the society. His work has very important features;he characterized conditions
for implementability not only in economic environments but also in noneconomic envi-
ronments both of which admit situations with externalities. The economic environments
he considered is much more general than exchange economies, as the former cover any
environment in which agents cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed. Moreover, the existence
of a worst outcome from the viewpoints of all agents in the society is not needed for his
theorems characterizing implementable social choice sets. Regarding the distribution
of information among the members of a society, he allowed for situations where agents
possess exclusive information. Besides, the set of states which all agents in the society
believe occur with positive probability is not necessarily required to coincide with the
set of possible states of the society.
His ﬁrst theorem showed that a collection of social choice functions in an economic
environment with at least three agents is Bayesian implementable if and only if clo-
sure (C), incentive compatibility (IC), and Bayesian monotonicity (BM) conditions are
satisﬁed. As he stated, this result closed the gap between the necessary and suﬃcient
conditions1 of Palfrey and Srivastava [4], who examined2 implementation for exchange
economies in which agents may have exclusive information.
The second theorem of Jackson [1] showed that closure, incentive compatibility, and
a condition that combines Bayesian monotonicity and no-veto power (which he calls
(MNV)) are suﬃcient for implementation in noneconomic environments with three or
more agents.
The closure condition in the implementation literature requires that the social choice
set be closed under concatenation of common knowledge events. In this paper, we ex-
amine the situations in which the closure condition is satisﬁed by any collection of social
choice rules in both economic and noneconomic environments. To this end, we deﬁne a
new condition for all environments, which we call ‘connection’. An environment is said
to satisfy connection if between any two probable states, there exists a string of probable
states such that from any one of them to the other, there is always one agent who cannot
make the distinction between the two. We ﬁrst prove that if there is always one agent
who cannot make the distinction between any two probable states, then the only event
which is common knowledge can be the set of all probable states (Lemma 1). Then, it
easily follows that all social choice sets satisfy closure if and only if the environment,
whether economic or noneconomic, satisﬁes connection (Proposition 1). We also show
1Palfrey and Srivastava [4] showed that a collection of social choice rules is implementable in Bayesian
(Nash) equilibrium if it satisﬁes the Bayesian monotonicity and incentive compatibility conditions.
Moreover, they showed that Bayesian monotonicity and a stronger incentive compatibility condition
(ε-IC) are suﬃcient for implementation.
2See also Palfrey and Srivastava [2], and Postlewaite and Schmeidler [5] for Bayesian implementation
results in exchange economies where there are at least three agents and the information is nonexclusive.
1that this new condition for environments becomes less restrictive as the number of pos-
sible information states of agents or the number of agents increases; so we should expect
the connection condition to be satisﬁed in the limit (Proposition 2).
Apparently, the connection condition allows us to restate Jackson’s [1] implemen-
tation results. We simply argue that when the environment with at least three agents
satisﬁes connection, the designer should pay attention to only (IC) and (BM) in economic
environments (Corollaries 3-5) and (IC) and (MNV) in noneconomic environments for
Bayesian implementation (Corollary 6).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reintroduces the environment and pre-
liminary deﬁnitions of Jackson [1]. Section 3 presents Jackson’s [1] results in Bayesian
implementation. Finally, Section 4 gathers the results of this paper and some concluding
remarks.
2. BASIC STRUCTURES (JACKSON [1])
Environments
There are a ﬁnite number, N, of agents. Let Si describe the ﬁnite number of possible




Let A denote the set of feasible allocations. A social choice function is a function
from states to allocations. The set of all social choice functions is X = {x|x : S → A}.
Each agent has a probability measure qi deﬁned on S. It is assumed that if qi(s) > 0
for some i and s ∈ S, then qj(s) > 0 for all j ￿= i. Let T denote the set of states which
all agents believe occur with positive probability, that is T = {s ∈ S|qi(s) > 0, ∀i}.
Πi are partitions of T deﬁned by qi. For a given information set si ∈ Si, πi(si) =
{t ∈ S|ti = si and qi(t) > 0} ∈ Πi denotes the set of states which i believes may be the
true state. It is assumed that πi(si) ￿= ∅ for all i and si ∈ Si. Let Π denote the ﬁnest
partition which is coarser than each Πi. For a given state s ∈ S, let π(s) be the element
of Π which contains s.
Each agent has preferences Ui : A×S → ￿+ over social choice functions which have
a conditional expected utility representation. Given x,y ∈ X and si ∈ Si, agent i’s weak














Preferences are complete and transitive. The strict preference and indiﬀerence relations
associated with Ri are Pi and Ii, respectively.
An environment is a collection [N,S,A,{qi},{Ui}], whose structure is assumed to be
common knowledge among the agents.
Deﬁnitions
2Definition 1. A social choice set is a subset of X.
Definition 2. The social choice functions x and y are equivalent if x(s) = y(s) for
all s ∈ T. The social choice sets F and ˆ F are equivalent if for each x ∈ F there exists
ˆ x ∈ ˆ F which is equivalent to x, and for each ˆ x ∈ ˆ F there exists x ∈ F which is equivalent
to ˆ x.
Definition 3. Let x/Cz be a splicing of two social choice functions x and z along a
set C ∈ S. The social choice function x/Cz is deﬁned by [x/Cz](s) = x(s) ∀s ∈ C, and
[x/Cz](s) = z(s) otherwise. An environment satisﬁes (E) if for any z ∈ X and s ∈ S,
there exist i and j (i ￿= j), x ∈ X and y ∈ X such that x and y are constant, x/CzPi(si)z
and y/CzP j(sj)z for all C ⊂ S such that s ∈ C. Environments satisfying (E) are said
to be economic.
Definition 4. Let B and D be any disjoint sets of states such that B ∪D = T and
for any π ∈ Π either π ⊂ B or π ⊂ D. A social choice set F satisﬁes closure (C) if for
any x ∈ F and y ∈ F there exists z ∈ F such that z(s) = x(s) ∀s ∈ B and z(s) = y(s)
∀s ∈ D.
Definition 5. Given i, x ∈ X, and ti ∈ Si, deﬁne xti by xti(s) = x(s−i,ti), s ∈ S.






Definition 6. A deception for i is a mapping αi : Si → Si. Let α = (α1,...,αN) and
α(s) = [α1(s1),...,αN(sN)]. Let x◦α represent the social choice function which results in
x[α(s)] for each s ∈ S.
Definition 7. Consider x ∈ F and a deception α. A social choice set f satisﬁes
Bayesian monotonicity (BM) if whenever there is no social choice function in F which








Definition 8. A social choice function z ∈ X satisﬁes the no-veto hypothesis (NVH)
at s ∈ T if there exists i such that zRj(sj)bj/Sz for all j ￿= i.
Definition 9. Consider the social choice set F, a deception α, and for each x ∈ F
and i consider a set Bi
x ⊂ Si. Let Bx = B1
x × ... × BN
x . Suppose that there exists z such
that for each x ∈ F and s ∈ Bx, z(s) = x◦α(s). Furthermore, suppose that z satisﬁes
(NVH) for each s ∈ T −(Ux∈FBx). F satisﬁes monotonicity-no-veto (MNV) if whenever
there is no social choice function in F which is equivalent to z, there exists i, y ∈ X,








Definition 10. An environment is said to have a “0” outcome if there exists a 0 ∈ A
such that Ui(0,s) = 0 for all i and s ∈ T, and for each s ∈ T and a ￿= 0 there exists i
such that Ui(a,s) > 0. In such an environment, given x ∈ X, let x0 denote the allocation
such that x0(s) = x(s) for s ∈ T and x0(s) = 0 otherwise. Given a social choice set
F, let F0 be the social choice set which is equivalent to F and such that x = x0 for all
x ∈ F 0.
Implementation
A mechanism is a pair consisting of an action space M =
￿N
i=1 Mi and a function
g : M → A.
A strategy for agent i is a mapping σi : Si → Mi. Let σ = [σ1,...,σN] and σ(s) =
(σ1(s1),...,σN(sN)) and g(σ) be the allocation which results when σ is played.
A vector of strategies σ is a Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium if g(σ)Ri(si) g(σ−i, ˜ σi) for
all i,si, and ˜ σi.
A mechanism (M,g) implements a social choice set F if:
(i) for any x ∈ F there exists an equilibrium σ with g[σ(s)] = x(s) for all s ∈ T, and
(ii) for any equilibrium σ there exists x ∈ F with g[σ(s)] = x(s) for all s ∈ T.
A social choice set F is implementable if there exists a mechanism (M,g) which
implements F.
3. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS OF JACKSON [1]
Theorem 1. (Jackson [1]) In an environment which satisﬁes (E) and N ≥ 3, a
social choice set F is implementable if and only if there exists a social choice set ˆ F which
is equivalent to F and satisﬁes (C), (IC), and (BM).
Corollary 1. (Jackson [1]) In an environment which satisﬁes (E), S = T, and
N ≥ 3, a social choice set F is implementable if and only if it satisﬁes (C), (IC), and
(BM).
Corollary 2. [1]) In an environment which satisﬁes (E) and N ≥ 3, and has a 0
outcome, a social choice set F is implementable if and only if F 0 satisﬁes (C), (IC), and
(BM).
Theorem 2. (Jackson [1]) If N ≥ 3, social choice set F which satisﬁes (C), (IC),
and (MNV), is implementable.
44. RESULTS
Definition 11. A set of states T ⊆ S satisﬁes the connection (CO) condition if for
all sa ∈ T and sb ∈ T there exists a string of states sa ≡ s0,s1,...,sr ≡ sb such that for





Lemma 1. An environment satisﬁes (CO) if 3 and only if Π = {T}.
Proof. We will ﬁrst show that Π = {T} implies (CO). Take any environment such
that Π = {T}. Suppose towards a contradiction that (CO) does not hold. Then there
exist some sa,sb ∈ T such that there exists no string of states sa ≡ s0,s1,...,sr ≡ sb





Now consider π(sa). We have π(sa) = T since Π = {T}. We also have sb / ∈ π(sa) since
(CO) does not hold, contradicting that sb ∈ T. Therefore in any environment satisfying
Π = {T}, (CO) must hold.
To show the suﬃciency part, assume (CO) is satisﬁed. Take any ˜ s ∈ T and s ∈ T.
Since (CO) holds by assumption, there exists a string of states ˜ s ≡ s0,s1,...,sr ≡ s such




k+1. Thus, s ∈ π(˜ s).
Since this is true for all s ∈ T, we have T ⊆ π(˜ s). We also have π(˜ s) ⊆ T (by the
suppositions that π(s) ∈ Π and Π is a partition of T). It then follows that π(˜ s) = T.
Therefore, Π = {T}. ￿
Note that S satisﬁes the (CO) condition since for all sa ∈ S and sb ∈ S the string
sa ≡ s0,s1,s2 ≡ sb with s1 = (s−i
a ,si
b) for some agent i connects sa to sb. (Note s1 is
an element of S as S = S1 × ... × SN). See Example 1 of Jackson [1] for an example of
T ⊂ S satisfying the (CO) condition.
Proposition 1. All social choice sets satisfy closure if and only if the environment
satisﬁes connection.4
Proof. To show the ‘if’ part, take any environment which satisﬁes (CO). Then Π =
{T} by Lemma 1. Let K be deﬁned as
K = {(B,D)|B ∩ D = ∅, (B ∪ D) = T and ∀π ∈ Π,π ∈ B or π ∈ D}.
It is obvious that whenever Π = {T}, Π has the single element π = T. Thus we have
K = {(T,∅),(∅,T)}.
3The ‘if part’ of the Lemma 1 as well as the need for the (CO) condition for an iﬀ statement were
proposed by Matthew Jackson, for which the author is grateful. The previous version of Lemma 1 was
just an ‘only if’ statement which stated that a condition stronger than (CO) implies Π = {T}.
4Lemma 1 and the proof of Proposition 1 suggest that Proposition 1 can be restated by replacing
the connection condition in the statement with Π = {T}. The need for Deﬁnition 11 will become clear
while proving Proposition 2.
5Any social choice set F then satisﬁes closure since for any x ∈ F and y ∈ F, we have a
social choice function z ∈ F given by
z =
￿
x if B = T
y if D = T
implying that z(s) = x(s) ∀s ∈ B and z(s) = y(s) ∀s ∈ D.
To show the ‘only if’ part, suppose (CO) is not satisﬁed implying that there ex-
ist π1,π2 ∈ Π such that π1 ￿= π2. Then the social choice set F = {x(.),y(.)} where
x(s) ￿= y(s) for all s ∈ S does not satisfy closure. ￿
We can now obtain a corollary for Theorem 1 of Jackson [1].
Corollary 3. In an environment which satisﬁes (E), (CO) and N ≥ 3, a social
choice set F is implementable if and only if there exists a social choice set ˆ F which is
equivalent to F and satisﬁes (IC), and (BM).
Since S satisﬁes the (CO) condition, we can restate the Corollary 1 of Jackson [1] as
follows:
Corollary 4. In an environment which satisﬁes (E), T = S, and N ≥ 3, a social
choice set F is implementable if and only if it satisﬁes (IC) and (BM).
As a special case of Corollary 2 of Jackson [1], we obtain the following result.
Corollary 5. In an environment which satisﬁes (E), (CO), N ≥ 3, and has a 0
outcome, a social choice set F is implementable if and only if F0 satisﬁes (IC), and (BM).
The (CO) condition has an implication on Theorem 2 of Jackson [1], as well.
Corollary 6. If N ≥ 3, and (CO) holds, social choice set which satisﬁes (IC), and
(MNV), is implementable.
It may be of an interest to know how restrictive the (CO) condition may be in soci-
eties involving very large number of states or agents.
Proposition 2. Let |Si| denote the cardinality of the set of states Si and be5 equal to
p ≥ 2 for all i. Let rco(p,N) denote the ratio of the number of possible sets of states
which do not satisfy the (CO) condition to the number of possible sets of states. Then
lim
N→∞r
co(p,N) = 0 and lim
p→∞r
co(p,N) = 0.
5Note when |Si| = 1 for all i, that is when information is common knowledge, we have |S| = 1, and
thus S satisﬁes the (CO) condition regardless what the number of agents is.
6Proof. I will prove the claim by showing that an upper-bound for rco(p,N) goes
to zero when N or p approaches to inﬁnity. Take any ˆ s ∈ S. Let Dˆ s represent the set
{s ∈ S|si ￿= ˆ si, ∀i}, at every element of which every agent can make the diﬀerence from ˆ s.
Note that |Dˆ s| = (p−1)N for all ˆ s ∈ S. Let Eˆ s denote the set {G∪{ˆ s}|G ⊆ Dˆ s and G ￿=
∅}, i.e., all nonempty subsets of Dˆ s unioned with ˆ s. We have |Eˆ s| = 2(p−1)N
− 1. Now
consider the set H = ∪ˆ s∈SEˆ s. We have |H| ≤
￿
ˆ s∈S |Eˆ s| = [2(p−1)N − 1]pN. Note that
for all sa ∈ S and sb ∈ S such that si
a ￿= si
b ∀i, we have {sa,sb} ∈ Esa ∩ Esb, thus
|H| < [2(p−1)N − 1]pN. The cardinality of the set of possible nonempty subsets of S is
equal to 2pN









for any p and N. Therefore, limN→∞rco(p,N) = 0 and limp→∞rco(p,N) = 0, which
completes the proof. ￿
A stronger condition than (CO) is that between any two states of the society, there
exists a state through which one agent can always serve as a link. Clearly, when (CO)
fails, this stronger condition fails, too. As the number of possible states or the number
of agents becomes inﬁnitely large, the measure of the possible sets of states which do not
satisfy this stronger condition become zero. Thus, we get the proof of Proposition 2.
Even though Proposition 2 does not cover situations where Si may diﬀer across
agents, it, nevertheless, helps to make a conjecture that the fraction of possible sets of
states which satisfy connection will be ‘almost’ one when the number of possible states
or the number of agents in the society is suﬃciently large. This observation strengthens
the fundamental theorems of Jackson [1] as in ‘large’ environments the closure may have
no bite at all in Bayesian implementation.
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